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Abstract. Understanding user behavior is essential to personalize and
enrich a user’s online experience. While there are significant benefits to be
accrued from the pursuit of personalized services based on a fine-grained
behavioral analysis, care must be taken to address user privacy concerns.
In this paper, we consider the use of web traces with truncated URLs –
each URL is trimmed to only contain the web domain – for this purpose.
While such truncation removes the fine-grained sensitive information, it
also strips the data of many features that are crucial to the profiling of
user activity. We show how to overcome the severe handicap of lack of
crucial features for the purpose of filtering out the URLs representing
a user activity from the noisy network traffic trace (including adver-
tisement, spam, analytics, webscripts) with high accuracy. This activity
profiling with truncated URLs enables the network operators to provide
personalized services while mitigating privacy concerns by storing and
sharing only truncated traffic traces.
In order to offset the accuracy loss due to truncation, our statistical
methodology leverages specialized features extracted from a group of
consecutive URLs that represent a micro user action like web click, chat
reply, etc., which we call bursts. These bursts, in turn, are detected
by a novel algorithm which is based on our observed characteristics of
the inter-arrival time of HTTP records. We present an extensive exper-
imental evaluation on a real dataset of mobile web traces, consisting of
more than 130 million records, representing the browsing activities of
10,000 users over a period of 30 days. Our results show that the pro-
posed methodology achieves around 90% accuracy in segregating URLs
representing user activities from non-representative URLs.
1 Introduction
Behavioral analysis of mobile users based on their web activities has the potential
to transform their online experience. It enables service providers to personalize
their deliverable, specialize their content, customize recommendations and target
advertisements based on user context. For the network operators, it opens up
the possibility of provisioning their resources and dynamically managing their
network infrastructure (particularly, with the realization of network function
virtualization) to effectively serve the varying user and content demand in order
to deliver advanced quality-of-service experience.
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However, behavioral analysis also raises serious concerns about user privacy.
Users are uncomfortable if personalization is taken too far. In the wider philo-
sophical debate between personalized services based on user behavior analysis
and preserving the user privacy, there is a need to find a middle ground that
will allow for potential benefits of personalized services and still safeguard the
fine-grained sensitive user information.1
Ideally, the data set for such analyses should be stripped of all sensitive
user information, while still allowing for inference of medium-grained user ac-
tivity. This is becoming even more important with the tightening privacy leg-
islations in various countries [21,1,10,6], increasing regulation (e.g., [11]) and
heavy penalties for data breaches which has made network operators as well
as service providers (e.g., [30]) more careful about the data sets they collect,
store and share. The operators would like to store the minimal amount of
data to still be able to perform complex analytics, raising the important ques-
tion of determining the thin boundary between the required data for neces-
sary analytics and the data that can enable mining of highly sensitive fine-
grained user traits. In this context, we consider the usage of truncated URLs,
wherein each URL is trimmed to only contain the web domain. For instance,
the HTTP URL finance.yahoo.com/q?s=BAC is truncated to finance.yahoo.com
(to hide the fact that the user had queried for Bank of America Corp. stock
price), the URL https://www.google.com/#q=postnatal+depression is truncated
to www.google.com (to avoid leaking the sensitive health query of the user) and
the URL www.amazon.com/Dell-Inspiron-i15R-15-6-inch-Laptop/dp/B009US2BKA
is truncated to www.amazon.com (to avoid leaking the searched or purchased
product). Already, many network operators only share the truncated URL data-
sets with third-party analysts, owing to privacy considerations. For the non-
HTTP traces (e.g., HTTPS encapsulated in IP packets), even the network oper-
ators, themselves, have limited information available. While a reverseDNS service
can be used to extract the URL from the IP address, it does not recovers the
content type or the query parameters. Thus, it is important to explore whether
high accuracy can still be obtained in profiling user activities if an analyst is
restricted to only using truncated-URL web trace. In this paper, we investigate
this issue.
Specifically, we focus on the task of identifying URLs that are representative
of user activities, which is often an important step in profiling user activities.
We note that the remaining task of mapping the representative URLs to activity
categories (and creating user profiles) can be done using either manual labeling
of interesting categories or in an automated way by using external databases or
web analytics services (e.g., Alexa [2]).
The key challenge in filtering out the representative URLs from noisy trun-
cated traffic trace is that a truncated trace lacks many crucial features for such
a filtering. These include the file name suffix (e.g., .jpg, .mp3, .mpg etc.) that
is usually a good indicator of the content type as well as number, type and val-
1 Specific search queries, personal entertainment preferences, purchased products,
location etc. are generally considered highly sensitive user information.
ues of parameters in the URL strings. Nonetheless, we show that even with the
truncated URLs, we can achieve a highly accurate automated classification of
web-domains into those that represent the user activity and those that don’t.
The key insight that we bring in this paper is that a user’s traffic trace is com-
posed of many data bursts. A burst usually corresponds to a micro user action
like a web click, chat reply, etc. and is typically associated with a unique activity.
We show that novel features related to burst measurements, such as positioning
of a URL in a burst, the number of URLs in the burst containing the web-domain
etc., can improve the accuracy of filtering the noise (unintentional traffic such as
spam, analytics, advertisements as well as other non-representative traffic such
as images, multimedia, scripts) out of the traffic trace, by around 20%, offsetting
the loss due to URL truncation.
To achieve this result, we need to decompose a traffic trace of a user into its
constituent data bursts. The problem here is that there is a significant variation
in the traffic pattern across different users, at different timestamps and different
activities. Even the distribution shape of the inter-arrival time of HTTP records
differs significantly from one user to another. We resolve this problem by propos-
ing a novel burst decomposition algorithm that adapts itself to any distribution
shape, rather than relying on specific distributions.
We provide an extensive experimental evaluation over more than 130 mil-
lion HTTP records generated from 10,000 users over a period of 30 days. The
experimental analysis demonstrates that our methodology provides high accu-
racy (around 90%), in segregating representative URLs from non-representative
URLs.
Our approach, thus, enables the network operators to personalize services
without risking the leakage of more sensitive user data (as the sensitive informa-
tion need not be stored or shared). Specifically, it enables many medium-grained
personalization applications, including, but not restricted to, product recom-
mendation and targeted advertisement. For instance, knowing when their users
read, shop, browse and play games, enables telecom operators to create bet-
ter pricing schemes that are personalized and targetted for different users and
demographics. Such profiling of user activity also opens up many avenues for
network optimization to service providers. For instance, system resources can
be better allocated to match the data access rate and desired delay time for
gaming activities at specific time in the day and better caching strategies can
be designed.
Outline In Section 2, we show that there is a considerable variation in the
user activity, that necessitates the data-dependent feature extraction and com-
plex statistical models to deal with this problem. Section 3 presents an overview
of our methodology. In Section 4, we argue that there is a considerable variation
in the distribution shapes of the inter-arrival time of HTTP records and thus,
the burst decomposition techniques that rely on specific distribution shapes do
not work well across the entire user spectrum. In Section 5, we show how we
can remedy the situation by using a threshold on the inter-arrival time of HTTP
records, that adapts to the distribution profile of each user. Section 6 presents
ll
l
392 GB
785 GB
1177 GB
5 14 310
25
50
75
100
0 25 50 75 100
user percentage
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f
do
w
n
lo
ad
 s
ize
(a)
l
l
l
392 M
785 M
1177 M
0
25
50
75
100
0 2.5 5
percentage of unique url
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f
do
w
n
lo
ad
 s
ize
(b)
l
l
l
6.5 M
13 M
19.5 M
0
25
50
75
100
0 2.5 5
percentage of unique url
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f
re
co
rd
s
(c)
Fig. 1: Summary statistics for the traffic trace of a randomly chosen batch of
2000 users.
the results of domain classification using the features extracted from burst mea-
surements. Section 7 presents an overview of some related work.
2 Variation in User Activity
The main goal of our investigation is to develop an automated procedure to
filter out representative URLs from the noisy trace of truncated HTTP records.
In this section, we describe our dataset. We show that in this dataset, there is a
significant variation between different users in terms of non-representative traffic,
user activities, number of HTTP records etc. In the next section, we propose a
novel methodology that employs robust algorithms for extracting user-dependent
features to overcome this high variation in user activity.
Dataset. Our dataset consists of more than 130 million web-logs generated
from randomly selected 10,000 users over a period of 30 days from an anonymous
network operator. In our traces, each record contains information fields such as
user hashed ID, truncated-URL, download size, upload size and timestamp. Note
that our dataset is not restricted to any particular domain or limited to a small
set of volunteer users. Being a network-side dataset, it is fairly large and diverse
in terms of the domains and the users covered. The flip side of this is that it is
also very noisy – it contains not just the URLs that a user types in his browser,
but also all the redirects, secondary URLs (pictures, embedded videos etc.) and
unintentional data (scripts, analytics, advertisement, spam etc.).
Variation in Total Traffic. We first observe that there is a significant vari-
ation in the HTTP traffic generated by different users. For instance, the number
of HTTP records ranges from low tens for some users to tens of thousands for
other users, over the 30 day period of study. In fact, a majority of HTTP down-
load traffic (75%) is generated by just 31% of user (Figure 1a). We observe even
more skewed distribution for the traffic in terms of the generating activity do-
main. Less than 0.5% of domains generate 75% of traffic in terms of download
size (Figure 1b) and HTTP record counts (Figure 1c). Note that even though a
large majority (99.5%) of URLs together constitute only a small portion (25%)
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Fig. 2: Snapshot of timestamped HTTP records with download size for two users,
showing a significant variation in amount of non-representative traffic.
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Fig. 3: Daily record count of top 5 user activities for two users; different colored
bars represent different user activities such as reading, searching, gaming.
of the traffic, these less popular URLs are more likely to characterize the unique
features of different users and therefore, they play a critical role in differentiat-
ing user specific behavior. Thus, it is vitally important to correctly classify these
URLs into those that represent the user activities and those that don’t.
Variation in Type of Traffic. Even among the users with similar total
traffic, the kind of web activities and the fraction of non-representative URLs
in the traffic trace varies considerably between the users. For instance, Figure
2 shows the web trace snapshot of two users, illustrating two different activity
patterns. Different colored segments in this figure represent traffic from different
domains, which can be either representative or non-representative. The trace of
the first user (Figure 2a) has only one domain, i.e. gaming, and in fact, repeated
records from a single URL for more than 1300 seconds. For this user, there is
no non-representative traffic to filter out. However, the web browsing activity of
another user shown in Figure 2b alternates between a large number of domains
(scripts, multimedia, HTML CSS, advertisements, analytics etc.) in less than 100
seconds, even though he/she is browsing a single web-page during this time. This
variation in activity patterns is reflected in download size, inter-arrival time as
well as number of HTTP records. In addition, the timestamp patterns of HTTP
records also varies significantly from one user to another (see Figure 2).
Variation in User Behaviors. We also observe that there is a significant
variation between different users in terms of the activities themselves. To sum-
marize the aggregated variation of the top-k domains of both representative and
non-representative traffic, we use the following global entropy-based metric to
measure this variation:
Sa =
−∑i nink log( nink )− log(k)
log(nk)− log(k) , (1)
where ni is the number of times that URL i appears in the top k domains,
satisfying
∑
i ni = nk. By Equation 1, the variation metric Sa is maximized at 1
when all users have different non-overlapping top k domain set and is minimized
at 0 when all users have the same non-ordered top k domain set. For the web
trace data, Sa is 0.484 with 1455 distinct domains from among the top k = 5
domains for the 2000 users. The discovered Sa value suggests that there is a
significant variation in the top activities among the different users. We show this
intuition graphically in Figures 3a and 3b, where we depict the activity variation
of two users over time. For this figure, we filtered out the non-representative
domains manually, selected top 5 representative domains for each user according
to the number of HTTP records. Figure 3 presents the daily record counts for
each representative domain and demonstrates both the temporal and activity
variations in terms of activity types and the magnitude across two randomly
selected users.
Summary. These above variational statistics imply that the methods to
extract features for separating noise from the representative URLs have to adapt
to changing user patterns. In particular, the variation in the total traffic and the
timestamp patterns necessitates user-adaptive solutions that we explore in the
next sections.
3 Our Methodology
In this section, we present an overview of our methodology to automatically
classify the web-domains into those that represent the user activities and those
that don’t. The key feature of this methodology is the usage of novel features
derived from the burst decomposition of a user’s web-trace that improves the
accuracy of the classification, offsetting the loss due to URL truncation.
The main intuition behind our methodology is that a user’s browsing activ-
ity consists of several data bursts. These data bursts correspond to micro user
actions, such as a web click or a chat reply. In each burst, there are some URLs
representing the user activity intermixed with other unintentional web-traffic
such as advertisements, web-analytics etc and secondary URLs corresponding
to multimedia associated with the representative URL. Our statistical method-
ology decomposes the web-trace back into its constituent data bursts. It then
leverages specialized features from data bursts (e.g., the position of a URL in a
data burst, the number of unique URLs in a data burst, burst duration, burst
download size etc.) to segregate the representative web-domains from the re-
maining web-domains. In Section 6, we show that the usage of features derived
from data burst help in significantly improving the accuracy of the segregation
task.
A key challenge in our methodology is the decomposition of the web-trace
into data bursts. As highlighted already in Section 2, there is a considerable
variation in the traffic patterns of different users. We found that even the distri-
bution of inter-arrival time of HTTP records is very different for different users.
This makes it particularly difficult to model these data bursts and to find good
thresholds to decompose the web-trace into data bursts. We solve this problem
by having different thresholds for different users and ensuring that the thresh-
old computing function is robust with respect to the distribution shape. This is
achieved using a novel technique to generate thresholds for each user that adapts
to any distribution of inter-arrival time.
4 Inter-arrival Time Distribution Models
In this section, we study the inter-arrival time of HTTP records with a view to
finding good thresholds that will decompose a user’s traffic-trace into burst of
records that represent micro user actions.
As described in Section 3, the key concept behind burst is that when a user
performs a micro action like web click, chat reply etc., it not only generates many
HTTP records related to the representative activity, but also a large number of
secondary records such as advertisements, web analytics, webscripts etc. These
records are all intermixed. When the user completes the current micro-action,
e.g. reading the current web page, and starts a new one, e.g. opening the next
page, a new burst is generated with its associated records. So, the observed
inter-arrival time records are the combined results of within-burst and out-of-
burst records. However, we expect that the within-burst HTTP records are closer
together and the out-of-burst records are far apart in time. By computing an
appropriate separation threshold on the inter-arrival time, we aim to decompose
the traffic into its constituent bursts.
Since traffic patterns and the inter-arrival time distributions for different
users are very different, we can’t expect a global threshold to work well for all
users. Instead, we compute a different threshold for each user specific to his/her
traffic patterns. If the difference between the time-stamp of a record and its
predecessor is greater than the computed separation threshold for that user, the
record marks the beginning of a new burst. Otherwise, the record belongs to the
burst of its predecessor.
To learn the separation threshold for each user, our first approach is to learn
the probability density function of inter-arrival time for the users. By computing
the best-fitting parameters for this density function for each user and defining
the separation threshold as a function of those parameters, we can decompose
the traffic trace for each user into its constituent bursts.
We modeled personalized inter-arrival time distributions by exploring differ-
ent density functions, such as exponential distribution, pareto distribution and
mixtures and concatenations of these distributions (details provided in Appendix
A). From the analysis, we found that even these general density functions are
not flexible enough to accommodate highly varied and personalized inter-arrival
time of different users. Thus, we concluded that even though this formalism is
principled, there is a need for a more robust technique to separate within-burst
and out-of-burst records, that is independent of the personalized distribution
shape of a user.
5 Burst Decomposition Using Adaptive Thresholds
In this section, we propose a robust burst decomposition algorithm that is in-
dependent of the distribution shape. Our technique only relies on the general
characteristics of the inter-arrival time distribution observed in Appendix A,
but not on any specific model. The only characteristic of the inter-arrival time
distribution that we use is that there is a within-burst component with high
arrival-rate of records (and small inter-arrival time), an out-of-burst component
with low arrival-rate (high inter-arrival time) forming a long tail and that these
two components are separable with a threshold. Our aim in this section is to
have a threshold that adapts itself to any inter-arrival time distribution, subject
to this general property.
We first observe that an optimal threshold τ? is expected to lay in a low
probability range and should satisfy the following conditions:
– ∀ x < τ?, p(x) should, generally, be high and show the presence of bursts
– ∀ x >= τ?, p(x) should, typically, have low values and imply user inactivity
periods
In order to satisfy the above conditions, τ? has to intercept the minimum
x point where the probability density function of inter-arrival time distribution
decays to fairly close to zero and the density of p(x) values beyond τ? is minimal.
However, to quantitatively measure the significance of each p(x) value, we
need a scalar indicator that would determine when a p(x) value is minimal. This
approach would suffer from the selection of a global scalar indicator that would
fail in detecting the intrinsic variations of the density proportion between the
within bursts and out-of bursts components for different users.
Therefore, instead of using this approach of quantifying p(x), we leverage the
conditional density, i.e. p(x)dx∫ x
0
p(y)dy
, to determine τ?. Note that, p(x)dx∫ x
0
p(y)dy
≈ ci∑i
j=1 cj
which is the probability that a time sample belongs to bin i, conditioning on the
fact that it belongs to a bin less than or equal to i: ki = Pr(x ∈ bi|x ∈ b1:i). In
other words, ki measures the contribution of the current bin to the accumulated
probability.
Our Algorithm 1 searches for τ? by starting from the smallest value of the
inter-arrival time density such that the extended probability by increasing decay-
ing point is insignificant, compared to the accumulated probability at that point
Algorithm 1 Burst Decomposition
1. Divide inter-arrival times into bins bi of length l with counts ci
2. Calculate ki =
ci∑i
j=1 cj
3. Find the smallest index i? that ki?+j < p ∀j = 1..J
4. Define the inter-arrival threshold τ? = l × i?
5. Group consecutive URLs with inter-arrival times τ < τ? into bursts.
(as captured by ki). Specifically, the threshold τ
? is found when the contributions
of J consecutive bins are less than a predefined probability, for a pre-specified
parameter J .
The burst decomposition algorithm will group all the records with inter-
arrival time less than the obtained τ? into actual bursts.
In the next section, we provide evidence that this algorithm detects mean-
ingful bursts that significantly improve the classification accuracy in identifying
the domains that represent user activities.
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Fig. 4: Calibrating parameter p by examining the variation of user behaviors
through the threshold τ?.
We estimate the values of the scalar indicator, p, used in the Algorithm 1
based on an analysis of the corresponding τ? values across all users. In Figure
4 we only report the τ? behaviors of 200 users as representative of entire τ?
values computed across all users. It is easy to notice that for p = 0.01 the τ?
would range from 1 to 10 seconds, which is a reasonable range to separate inter-
arrival time values between within burst and out-of bursts for activities such
as web browsing, reading, shopping, etc. Hence, this value of p was used in our
experimental analysis.
Next, we examine the results of our algorithm with respect to users with sub-
stantially different behaviors. In particular, we leverage the three users examined
in Figure 9. Even though the distribution shapes and the number of records char-
acterizing these three users are very different, the algorithm successfully finds a
user specific τ? as shown in Figure 5.
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Fig. 5: User dependent τ? obtained from burst decomposition algorithm.
6 Domain classification
In this section, we describe our classification model for identifying the represen-
tative URLs and show that it is possible to achieve very high accuracy for this
task even with truncated URLs. Features extracted from the burst decompo-
sition presented in Section 5 play a crucial role in significantly improving the
accuracy of our classification model.
Classification Model Formalization. We use a logistic regression model
for the domain classification problem. Our model for logistic regression is as
follows:
yi ∼ Bernoulli(qi), (2)
ln(
qi
1− qi ) = µi = β0 +
∑
l
βlxi,l, (3)
where yi is the binary label (yi = 1 if URL i is representative and yi = 0 other-
wise) and xi,l is the specific classification feature that we derive from record-level
and burst-level analysis in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. The representative probability
qi is computed by the logistic function on a linear predictor µi and all the pa-
rameters are estimated by the Iteratively Re-Weighted Least Squares (IRWLS)
method [24].
The domain classification follows three steps. First, we manually label 400
URLs into two classes: representative and non-representative domains. Second,
we extract five sets of web traces generated out of 2K random users each, perform
the burst decomposition and obtain aggregated measurements independently for
each set. Finally, half of the labelled URLs of the first set are used in training the
classifier, which is validated by the other half of the first set and the remaining
four. We use five different sets to validate the robustness of our approach.
We demonstrate the accuracy of our classification approach in two steps. We
first study the accuracy obtained by only using the record-level features and
ignoring the burst-level features. Then, we show the improvements we gain by
Table 1: Aggregated measurements at record-level where R(i) denotes the set of
records containing domain URL i.
Record-level features (wrt R(i))
tr,l,k Quantile k of the leading inter-arrival time
tr,n,k Quantile k of the next inter-arrival time
sr,u,k Quantile k of the upload size
sr,d,k Quantile k of the download size
Table 2: AIC and classification accuracy with
record-level features.
AIC BIC Classification accuracy on
5 sets of 2K users each.
CR 242.82 252.72 69.7 72.9 71.0 70.8 71.4
Table 3: Estimated values (βl), standard devi-
ation (σβ), p-values and significance (SIG) for
logistic regression model with record-level fea-
tures.
Feature βl σβ p-value SIG
Intercept −1.41 0.38 1.8e− 4 ***
sr,d,75% − sr,d,25% −0.03 0.01 4.7e− 4 ***
sr,u,50% 0.86 0.26 1.0e− 3 ***
adding the burst-level features which are derived upon the detected bursts from
our burst decomposition algorithm.
Record-level Features. The key part of our modeling is feature engineering,
or identifying the right set of features to achieve a high accuracy. For the record-
level features, shown in Table 1, we use the aggregated measurements across
all users and compute the quantile values k by ranging k from 5 to 95 with an
increment step equal to 5. These features were carefully selected to achieve a
high accuracy with record-level features. Specifically, for each record we collect
the leading and following inter-arrival time and the upload and download size.
These features are examined as covariates in our domain classification model.
6.1 Accuracy with Record-level Features
Accuracy. As shown in Table 2, the resultant accuracy with the record-level
features is quite poor. For the five sets of web traces, the accuracy varies between
69.7% and 72.9%, implying that around 30% of the URLs are misclassified.
Among the analyzed features we have discovered two particularly important:
x·,1 = (sr,d,75% − sr,d,25%) and x·,2 = sr,u,50% by the stepwise model selection
procedure. The first is the difference between the 75 and 25 quantile statistics
of the download size per domain and the second is the 50 quantile statistic of
the upload size. The estimated coefficients for this model is shown in Table 3,
implying that domains with small variation of download size and high value of
upload size have higher chance of being representative domains. However they
are the most relevant features at record-level, their discriminatory capacity still
remains limited.
Table 4: Aggregated measurements at burst-level
where B(i) denotes the set of bursts containing URL
i.
Burst-level features (wrt B(i))
ob,j The probability that URL i is ranked j-th
(j = 1 : 9)
ub,j The probability that a burst containing
URL i has j unique URLs (j = 1 : 9) in the burst
db,k Quantile k of burst duration
tb,l,k Quantile k of the leading inter-arrival time
of a burst
tb,n,k Quantile k of the next inter-arrival time of
a burst
sb,u,k Quantile k of the burst upload size
sb,d,k Quantile k of the burst download size
Table 5: Estimated values (βl), stan-
dard deviation (σβ), p-values and sig-
nificance (SIG) for logistic regression
model with all features.
Feature βl σβ p-value SIG
Intercept −3.30 0.52 2.2e− 11 ***
ob,j=1 22.87 3.32 5.5e− 12 ***
ub,j=2 −9.51 3.45 0.01 **
6.2 Accuracy with Burst-level Features
In this section, we show how the accuracy improves with features measured at
burst-level.
Burst-level Features. By leveraging the burst decomposition algorithm, we
segment our web traces in a series of consecutive bursts and we measure burst-
specific characteristics. Specifically, for each URL i, we choose a list of aggregated
measurements, shown in Table 4, where B(i) denotes the set of bursts containing
URL i. We observe that two burst features, i.e. ob,j and ub,j (j = 1 : 2), in
Table 6 are particularly important in improving the domain classification results.
The first measure, i.e. ob,j , describes the probability that a URL is ranked j in
its burst and the second, i.e. ub,j , quantifies the probability that there are j
unique domains in the burst containing the URL (j = 1 : 2). Similar to record-
level features, these aggregated measurements are examined as covariates in our
domain classification model.
Discriminating Features. We perform a model selection procedure, based
on AIC, to select the most discriminating features for our classification model
and starting from those listed in Table 4. We observe that the feature ob,j=1 =
ob,j=1−ub,j=1 is selected with high significance. The intuition behind this is that
the URLs which usually come first in bursts are more likely belonging to the rep-
resentative class. Thus, ob,j=1 is a good distinguishing feature between represen-
tative domains (SEARCH ENGINE, WEB PORTAL) and non-representative
domains (ADS, CDN) (as shown in Figure 6). Solely using this feature will mis-
classify domains from STATIC CONTENT class as representative (as these are
also likely to come first in burst). This class includes many CSS HTML pages
and static images on web-pages. However, the exceptions such as those from
STATIC CONTENT class have a high probability of being alone in their bursts,
as shown by ub,j=1 in Figure 6. Thus, the feature ob,j=1 is able to distinguish
between most representative and non-representative domains.
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Fig. 6: The probability ob,j that a URL is ranked j in its burst and the probability
ub,j that there are j records in the burst containing the URL (j = 1 : 2) for
different domains.
Note that the domains in the SEARCH ENGINE class have a unique char-
acteristic, i.e. they show high values in both ub,j=1 and ob,j=1 features. However,
the differenced ob,j=1 can still act as a discriminator in selecting representative
domains.
The corresponding estimated coefficients βl are shown in Table 5 along with
standard deviation and p-values, indicating all significant coefficients. As ex-
plained above, domains that have high rankings among others, i.e. do not appear
alone in their bursts, are more likely to be representative domains. From the es-
timated value ub,j=2, we can also see that domains appearing in small bursts of
few unique records have smaller chance of becoming representative domains.
6.3 Trade-off Between Classification Metrics
The relation between the linear predictor µi and representative probability qi is
plotted in Figure 7, together with the binary labelled observations and histogram
of each domain class. The red vertical line represents the decision boundary such
that all URL with qi ≥ h = 0.5 are put into representative class and the other
are in the non-representative class. Hence, the ratio between the points on the
left and right of the red line at row q = 0 corresponds to the ratio between true
negative-ness and false positive-ness. Similarly, the ratio between true positive-
ness and false negative-ness is at row q = 1.
In Figure 7, we use the boundary value h = 0.5, corresponding to the case of
minimizing the number of misclassification cases to separate between represen-
tative and non-representative records. However, from a decision theory point-of-
view, as the false-positive and false-negative penalties are usually different, we
may want to optimize the boundary value by customizing these penalties based
on application specific requirements. For instance, let’s consider an application
that generates users’s profiles. These kind of applications may want to put a
higher penalty for false negatives (representative URLs incorrectly classified as
non-representatives) than for false positives (non-representative URLs correctly
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Fig. 8: Receiver operating characteristic curve.
classified as representative). This is because when determining the activity of a
burst, there is an opportunity to prune out the noise (non-representative URLs)
further, while the representative URLs lost in the process are unlikely to be
re-inserted later on. Thus, these applications should be calibrated to improve
sensitivity, i.e. the ratio of correctly classified representative URLs to the total
number of representative URLs.
Because the penalties are problem-specific and not obvious in many con-
texts, we show the trade-off between true positive rate (complement of false
negative rate) and false positive rate with the receiver operating characteristic
curve (ROC) in Figure 8. The figure also illustrates another optimal boundary
point in purple for the case of minimizing the sum of false positive and false neg-
ative rates. The high value of area under the curve (AUC), [12], again confirms
the good performance of our classifier.
Table 6 provides further statistics on the trade-off between false positives
and true negatives for two different values of the boundary, that were shown
in Figure 8. These trade-offs are characterized in terms of precision, negative
predictive value, sensitivity, specificity and accuracy. We note that while the
value of h = 0.5 results in higher precision and accuracy, the h = 0.166 results
in better sensitivity. Thus, for applications with more emphasis on accuracy, we
may choose h = 0.5, while for applications where sensitivity is crucial, we may
select h = 0.166.
Accuracy. The usage of burst-level features, and in particular ob,j=1, results
in significant improvement in the accuracy of the classification model. As shown
in Table 7, the accuracy improves from around 70% to around 90%; AIC value
drops from 242.82 without burst-level features to just 112.8 with these features;
and finally, the BIC drops from 252.72 to 122.69.
Altogether, these results show that it is possible to achieve a 90% accuracy in
segregating representative URLs from non-representative URLs by using burst-
level features on truncated URL web-traces. In other words, the burst decomposi-
Table 6: Trade-off between accuracy, sensi-
tivity, precision and specificity.
h 0.500 0.166
Precision 0.93 0.77
Negative Predictive Value 0.90 0.95
Sensitivity 0.78 0.91
Specificity 0.97 0.87
Accuracy 0.91 0.88
Table 7: AIC and classification accuracy.
AIC BIC Classification accuracy
CB 112.80 122.69 90.0 88.3 90.2 89.2 90.5
CR 242.82 252.72 69.7 72.9 71.0 70.8 71.4
tion and the extraction of specific features from the bursts overcome the informa-
tion lost due to URL truncation. Note that this accuracy is in terms of the num-
ber of URLs correctly classified as being representative or non-representative.
Popular URLs are more likely to be correctly classified by our methodology and
thus, the accuracy in terms of number of records, download size (e.g., to answer
questions like how much download is generated corresponding to each activity
type) or number of bursts (identifying the activity for each burst) is likely to be
significantly higher.
7 Related Work
The past research related to identifying URLs representing user activities falls
into the following categories:
1. Providing an activity description at a very coarse level (e.g., peer-to-peer net-
working, HTTP browsing, chatting etc.) by filtering out URLs based on con-
nection port number, packet payload, statistical traffic patterns etc. [17,29],
primarily for the purpose of network traffic analysis and traffic classification
(e.g. for CDN).
2. Manual blacklisting of URLS to filter out spam, adult content or advertise-
ments.
3. Filter out the unintentional traffic by relying on URL suffixes (e.g., .mp3, .js
etc.), URL header patterns, HTTP referrers and HTTP blacklists.
The first category of coarse-grained application-type classification is different
from our representative URL identification problem as our goal is to segregate
URLs at the HTTP domain-level (HTTP browsing itself is just one class for
the coarse-grain classification). From the behavioral analysis’ perspective, traf-
fic classification [17,29] cannot provide a medium-grained insight into user web
activities such as reading, shopping, researching, etc.
The second category has obvious scalability limitations. Given that many
new web-sites appear every day in different languages and different countries that
may have very local characteristics, it is very expensive to manually maintain the
blacklists. Furthermore, the existing blacklists (see [27] for a list of many manual
blacklists) are for specific purposes (such as spam, adult content, advertisements)
and do not contain all non-representative URLs (such as images and videos
associated with the main content). In fact, it is difficult to even filter out all
unintentional traffic using only these blacklists.
The third category critically relies on full HTTP web-traces. For some pa-
pers (e.g., [28]) in this category, the setting even allows to take a peek into a
user’s full network traffic (including a deep packet inspection of the content). The
full HTTP URLs can reveal highly sensitive user information and their usage
raises serious privacy concerns. For instance, Song et al. [19] highlighted a prac-
tical privacy attack that exploits seemingly-anonymous recorded information of
shortened URL service such as HTTP referrer URLs, countries, browsers, plat-
form, etc to infer the clicking pattern of a specific user. In contrast, our focus is
on inferring medium-grained user behavior analysis from minimal traffic traces
(truncated-URLs) and on techniques that will allow us to offset the accuracy
loss due to URL truncation.
Furthermore, our work deals with a large, diverse, but noisy traffic trace from
a network-side. This allows us to perform a detailed study that is not limited
to a few domains or restricted to a few volunteer users. This is in contrast
with many publications on behavior analysis that deal with data from users or
service-providers.
Privacy preserving user profiling. There has been considerable work in
recent years on privacy preserving personalization. Herein, we list a few ap-
proaches:
Bilenko and Richardson [7] also consider the problem of user profiling while
mitigating the privacy concerns. However, their approach is based on storing the
sensitive information on the client side, in the form of cookies or browser local
storage. The storage of this sensitive information still leaves a user vulnerable
to privacy violations. On the other hand, our user profiling does not require the
sensitive information to be stored at all. Similar client-side approaches in the
context of personalized search (e.g., [25]) and online advertisements (e.g., [22])
have also been studied.
Nandi et al. [4] take an alternative approach to privacy preserving personal-
ization. They replace the user traces by traces of group of similar users. However,
this requires user segmentation, which in turn, requires significant historical data.
Also, this results in an aggregate level personalization and not an individual level
personalization.
Also, there are some theoretical solutions based on k-anonymity [20] and
l-diversity [16] for preserving privacy. However, it is not clear if they can be
useful for profiling personalized time-series data. There are also some approaches
(e.g. [15]) that add random or correlated noise to the data to preserve the privacy.
However, such approaches also introduce more noise in the user profiles.
Burst Detection. Kleinberg [14] proposed a discrete state space model as a
burst detection algorithm, with applications in email streams. However, the focus
of this solution is the varying exponential distribution’s rate, modelled by the
hidden state. The rate characterizes the email arrival of a temporal local period
but does not provide a clear distinction between within-burst and out-of-burst
records. For example, even when the rate goes down to the smallest value, the
positive skewness of exponential distribution still favours small inter-arrival time
samples. Such an approach is unlikely to work for our problem of segregating
two inter-arrival time classes.
Crovella and Bestavros [9] and Wang et al. [23] looked at the related problem
of counting process modeling of download size, open connection, disk operation
request, etc. However, these papers primarily focus on the self-similarity property
of the time series and do not provide a clear distinction and separation of different
HTTP record types.
Karagiannis et al. [13] showed that the accuracy of exponential distribution
varies with different backbone packet traces. In general, exponential distribu-
tion has nice mathematical features such as memoryless-ness and closed-form
solutions of sum-concat-minimum operators. However, its light tailed property
may not be a good match to some datasets. In a more general context of hu-
man dynamics, Barabasi [5] discussed the bursty nature of human actions and
argued that heavy tailed distribution pareto is a better match than exponential
distribution with email data analysis. However, both of these papers analyze
aggregated datasets, and not the per-user dataset which is much more dynamic.
8 Discussion
We have proposed a novel methodology to identify URLs representing user ac-
tivities from a truncated URL web-trace. Our statistical methodology offsets
the loss in accuracy due to URL truncation by considering additional features
derived from the burst measurements. To enable the computation of burst-level
features, we propose a novel technique for burst decomposition.
Once the set of representative URLs is identified, one can compare the (live)
streaming web-traces of users to infer medium grained activities in real-time
and offer personalized services. Burst decomposition can play a critical role in
this part as well. Once the user-adaptive thresholds are identified, our burst
decomposition algorithm can be used to decompose the streaming trace into
bursts and a unique URL representing the activity in that burst can be identified
using the identified set of representative URLs.
We consider that our methodology can be very useful for providing personal-
ized services, while being considerate about more sensitive user privacy data. For
instance, state-of-the-art techniques to predict click-through-rate (CTR) rely on
behavioral targeting of fine-grained user data [8], such as advertisement clicks,
web-page clicks, page views and search query data. A medium-grained user pro-
filing, such as the one created by our technique, can be used to provide good
CTR predictions while preserving privacy considerations. Similarly, user segmen-
tation based on behavioral targeted advertisement (e.g., [26]) can also benefit
from our medium-grained profiling. Our profiling can also be employed to re-rank
the search results for a more personalized experience (similar to the approach in
[25]). More generally, we hope that our work will lead to deeper studies on the
usage of truncated URL traces, as a means to striking the fine balance between
personalized services and user privacy.
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A Modeling Inter-arrival Time Distribution
We consider the models of exponential and Pareto distribution functions to fit
the inter-arrival time samples of all users. Specifically, we use the following dis-
tribution functions:
– Exponential Distribution (EXP):
pEXP (x) = fλ(x) = λ exp(−λx), (4)
where λ is the inter-arrival rate of all records.
– Pareto Distribution (PRT):
pPRT (x) = gα(x) = αx
α
mx
−α−1, (5)
where xm is the minimum value of the Pareto distribution and α is the shape
parameter.
In addition, we use two mixture models. The intuition behind the mixture ap-
proximation is that the two models will respectively capture the high arrival
rate for the within-burst records, and the slow arrival rate for the out-of-burst
records.
– Mixture of two Exponential Distributions (EXP2):
pEXP2(x) = wfλ1(x) + (1− w)fλ2(x), (6)
where λ1 and λ2 are the corresponding inter-arrival rate parameters for
within-burst and out-of-burst records with λ1 > λ2; w is the proportion
of within-burst records.
– Mixture of two Pareto Distributions (PRT2):
pPRT2(x) = wgα1(x) + (1− w)gα2(x), (7)
where α1 and α2 are the corresponding Pareto shapes of within-burst and
out-of-burst records; w is the proportion of within-burst records.
We observed that the exponential component matches with the within-burst
records while the heavy tailed Pareto component is better for out-of-burst records.
Hence, we use another function form:
– Concatenation of Exponential and Pareto Distributions (EXP PRT):
pEXP PRT (x) = z[exp(−λx)I(x ≤ d) + cx−α−1I(x > d)], (8)
where I(·) is the indicator function, z is the density normalization constant
and the constant c is to make the function continuous.
These five distributions are fitted with per-user inter-arrival records and all the
parameters λ, α, w and d for each user are estimated by Maximum Likelihood
Estimation (MLE) method.
Note that our goal is not just to model the inter-arrival density function, but
to model it in a parameterized way that provides an intuition for identifying
the separation threshold for burst decomposition. Kernel density approximation
may be well-matched for the target density but cannot be used as it does not
imply any meaning of record types.
The mixture models of the standard exponential and Pareto functions portray
such an intuition. For example, in the method EXP2, the exponential component
with high arrival rate is supposed to contain all within-burst records; So, its
99% quantile can be used as a threshold to separate the records types. Or in the
method EXP PRT, the location parameter d can be used as the threshold as it
is the boundary of the exponential component for within-burst records and the
heavy-tail Pareto distribution for out-of-burst records.
A.1 Model Selection and Evaluation
We consider the inter-arrival time distribution of various users to determine (i)
whether or not our basic intuition of a user’s data traffic as essentially consisting
of a series of burst is true, (ii) which of the considered functions best fits the
inter-arrival time distribution of users and (iii) how well does the best fitting
function matches the inter-arrival time distribution of users.
We observed that for most users, there are two well-separated components
in the inter-arrival time distributions. Furthermore, for most users, the expo-
nential function tightly matches the within-burst component and the tail of the
Pareto function closely matches the portion of human activity with long delay,
corresponding with the out-of-burst records. In addition, the positive skewness
of both exponential and Pareto distributions implies the existence of compacted
within-burst records, which have small inter-arrival time. All of these observa-
tions confirm our basic intuition that a user’s data-traffic primarily consists of a
number of contiguous bursts of URL records. Furthermore, the two components
of within-burst and out-of-burst records in the inter-arrival time distribution are
usually separable.
Determining the Best-fit Model. Next, we consider the modeling of inter-
arrival time distributions. We compare the fitness of all the studied distributions
by using Akaike information criterion (AIC) [3], based on the Kullbeck-Leiber
discrepancy between the true unknown model and the best estimated model
of the assumed family and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) [18], based on
the Laplace approximation of the marginal likelihood. The EXP PRT model,
presented in Equation 8, shows the best AIC and BIC values, i.e. the smallest
discrepancy between the data and the model, which we have highlighted in bold
in Table 8. Thus, we conclude that the EXP PRT model best fits the target inter-
arrival time distribution, with its exponential function capturing the within-
burst component and its Pareto function matching the out-of-burst component.
Table 8: Evaluation of AIC/BIC (×1e6) of different density approximations.
EXP EXP2 PRT PRT2 EXP PRT
AIC 291.14 179.77 118.20 118.21 59.59
BIC 291.17 179.86 118.23 118.30 59.68
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Fig. 9: Density approximation of inter-arrival time with inner log scale density
plots (target curve is plotted in red).
Fitting Error of the EXP PRT Model Across All Users. We investi-
gate whether the EXP PRT model is able to capture the diversity across users
with high level of accuracy. As we are going to show next, this is not always true
and so, a robust technique to separate within-burst and out-of-burst records that
is independent of user-based distribution shape is needed.
Figure 9 shows the distribution fitting of EXP2, PRT2 and EXP PRT func-
tions for three different users. We find that out of the three users considered in
this figure, the EXP PRT function fits the target inter-arrival time distribution
of two users (Figures 9a and 9c) very well, but it is a poor match for the third
user (Figure 9b). We quantify the density approximation error by the following
measure:
Sb =
∫
x
|p(x)− q(x)|dx, (9)
Here, p(x) is the target kernel density as interpolated (from the inter-arrival
time distribution of the user) by a kernel density approximation function. The
function q(x) is the one that we use to fit our target distribution. The error
measure is calculated by numerical integration.
The value of our error metric ranges from 0 to 2, where 0 corresponds to a
perfect fit. The closer the error statistic is to 1.0, the poorer is the fit, and a value
of greater than 1.0 reflects an extremely poor fit. The error measurements of the
method EXP PRT for Figures 9a, 9b and 9c are 0.46, 0.84 and 0.26 respectively.
Figure 10 presents the variation in the value of our error metric for various
fitting functions, over all users. Again, we observe that the EXP PRT function
results in the lowest error (even with this error measure). However, this is still a
poor fit. The median user has an error of 0.72, which means that about 50% of
the users have approximation errors Sb,EXP PRT larger than 0.72. We consider
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Fig. 10: Density approximation errors of different methods.
that this is too high an error to be useful for developing an analytics system
using it. More specifically, the thresholds based on such a poorly fitting function
are unlikely to result in a good burst decomposition.
The above analysis suggests that these density functions are not flexible
enough to accommodate highly varied and personalized inter-arrival time of dif-
ferent users. Thus, there is a need for a robust technique to separate within-burst
and out-of-burst records that is independent of the personalized distribution
shape of a user.
